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Completely Unguided Discretion: Admitting Non-
Statutory Aggravating and Non-Statutory Mitigating 
Evidence in Capital Sentencing Trials 
SHARON TURLINGTON∗ 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
As an attorney practicing exclusively in the area of death penalty de-
fense at the trial level for the last ten years, my perspective on the prob-
lems inherent in the system seems vastly different from that presented in 
academic research and even in case law.  While most of the recent changes 
in death penalty law have focused on the right of the defendant to have 
sentencing enhancing elements of an offense proven to a jury beyond a 
reasonable doubt,1 much of the evidence presented in an actual death pen-
alty jury trial is non-statutory aggravation and non-statutory mitigation.  
Generally, non-statutory aggravating evidence shows the impact of the 
crime on the victim’s family or involves prior bad acts of the defendant.  
Non-statutory mitigating evidence involves the defendant’s background, 
good character, and ability to adjust to a jail setting or anything about his 
involvement in the crime, which is mitigating.  These types of evidence are 
admitted at the discretion of the trial judge, often without any instructional 
guidance for the jury.  Little attention has been given to why it is constitu-
tionally acceptable for the sentencing phase of a capital trial to be an evi-
dentiary free-for-all and to whether this is an unconstitutional exercise of 
state power.   
Statutory schemes requiring guided discretion in sentencing are stan-
dard in the federal government, as well as states that have a death penalty.  
Throughout this article, I refer to Missouri’s death penalty scheme as an 
example when discussing the problems in admitting non-statutory aggra-
vating and non-statutory mitigating evidence without any guidance.  In this 
article, I will outline the procedure followed in sentencing a person to 
death and analyze problems with allowing juries to consider non-statutory 
  
 ∗ Sharon Turlington has been a member of the Missouri State Public Defender’s Office Capital 
Litigation Division since 1997.  Since 1997 she has focused exclusively on death penalty litigation at 
the trial level in Missouri, handling all aspects of capital trial work including jury trials, bench trials, 
plea bargaining, pre-trial motion practice, and investigation of guilt phase and penalty phase defenses. 
 1. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 612 (2002).  
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aggravating and mitigating evidence without instructional guidance, which 
make the imposition of the death penalty unconstitutionally arbitrary.  
II.  CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR PENALTY PHASE AFTER 
DEFENDANT HAS BEEN CONVICTED OF MURDER 
A. Statutory Aggravating Circumstances and the Death Eligibility Step 
When the U.S. Supreme Court determined that individual states could 
constitutionally reinstate the death penalty, they focused on procedural 
safeguards to make sure that the death penalty would not be applied in an 
arbitrary manner.2  According to the Court, a statutory scheme for imposi-
tion of the death penalty is constitutional if it provides the sentencer with 
clear standards to determine when the death penalty should be imposed and 
avoids arbitrary and discriminatory application of the death penalty.3  This 
has resulted in the creation of statutory aggravating, or special, circum-
stances that supposedly narrow the class of homicides in which the death 
penalty can be sought.  Statutory aggravating circumstances are simply 
facts, delineated by statute, which, when proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt, can make a defendant eligible for the death penalty.4  However, 
these circumstances do not, in fact, function as intended and are often un-
constitutionally applied.   
According to the Court, the characteristics of the individual offender 
and the individual offense must be considered as part of the sentencing 
decision.5  Additionally, the law must allow the defendant to present any 
evidence in mitigation of punishment at the sentencing hearing.6  More-
over, appellate review must be guaranteed to ensure that the death penalty 
is applied fairly and to ensure that the death penalty is not excessive or 
disproportional to the seriousness of the offense.7   
The commands of the U.S. Constitution, as interpreted by the Supreme 
Court, have forced both the states and the federal government to set up 
fairly consistent procedures for determining when a criminal defendant can 
  
 2. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 206–07 (1976).   
 3. Kansas v. Marsh, 126 S. Ct. 2516, 2524 (2006) (citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) 
and Gregg, 428 U.S. at 153).   
 4. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. §§ 565.030, 565.032 (2000). 
 5. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 602–03 (1978). 
 6. See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 113–14 (1982) (constitutionally acceptable statutory 
schemes for implementation of the death penalty must not limit mitigation evidence presented on 
behalf of the defendant); Lockett, 438 U.S. at 608. 
 7. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 194–95.   
File: Turlington - 6 Pierce L. Rev. 3 Created on: 3/5/2008 9:48:00 PM Last Printed: 3/10/2008 10:19:00 PM 
2008 COMPLETELY UNGUIDED DISCRETION 471 
 
be sentenced to death.8  The general death penalty procedure involves two 
steps.  The first is the eligibility step.9  The requirement that a state narrow 
the class of death eligible cases is satisfied by the state giving notice of, 
and proving an aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt.10  
Because aggravating circumstances are used as a sentencing enhancement, 
they must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt and must be decided by 
the jury.11  In order for a defendant to be death eligible, a jury must unani-
mously decide that the state has proven an aggravating circumstance be-
yond a reasonable doubt.12  If the jury finds that the eligibility step has 
been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, they can consider the second step. 
The second step is the selection, or weighing, step.  After an individual 
is considered death eligible, the jury must consider whether or not this par-
ticular individual in this particular case should be sentenced to die.13  At 
this stage, the Constitution requires that the jury be able to consider evi-
dence that mitigates punishment.14  This is generally set up as a weighing 
of the evidence in aggravation of punishment against the evidence in miti-
gation of punishment.15  Missouri’s weighing step directs the jury to return 
a verdict of life if the evidence in mitigation of punishment outweighs the 
evidence in aggravation of punishment.16 
Statutory aggravating factors are supposed to narrow the class of per-
sons eligible for the death penalty.  Missouri, for example, has seventeen 
statutory aggravating circumstances.17  Most states and the Federal Death 
Penalty Act have aggravating circumstances that are substantially similar.18   
  
 8. See, e.g., Federal Death Penalty Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3592(a)–(d) (2006) [hereinafter FDPA]; see 
also MO. REV. STAT. § 565.032 (2000).   
 9. See generally FDPA, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3592(a)–(d).   
 10. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 612 (2002); see also Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977) 
(holding that defendant has a right to have notice of all aggravating evidence which the state may 
present). 
 11. Ring, 536 U.S. at 609. 
 12. Id.; see also MO. REV. STAT. § 565.030 (2000).    
 13. Kansas v. Marsh, 126 S. Ct. 2516, 2524–25 (2006). 
 14. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 608 (1978). 
 15. See generally FDPA, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3592(a)–(d).  
 16. MO. REV. STAT. § 565.030.4(3) (2000). 
 17. Id. § 565.032.  The seventeen statutory aggravating circumstances are: 
1. The offense was committed by a person with a prior record of conviction for murder in 
the first degree, or the offense was committed by a person who has one or more serious as-
saultive criminal convictions; 
2. The murder in the first degree offense was committed while the offender was engaged in 
the commission or attempted commission of another unlawful homicide; 
3. The offender by his act of murder in the first degree knowingly created a great risk of 
death to more than one person by means of a weapon or device which would normally be 
hazardous to the lives of more than one person; 
4. The offender committed the offense of murder in the first degree for himself or another, 
for the purpose of receiving money or any other thing of monetary value from the victim of 
the murder or another; 
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However, upon reviewing the seventeen aggravating circumstances in 
Missouri, it is difficult to imagine a murder in the first degree in which the 
  
5. The murder in the first degree was committed against a judicial officer, former judicial 
officer, prosecuting attorney or former prosecuting attorney, circuit attorney or former cir-
cuit attorney, assistant prosecuting attorney or former assistant prosecuting attorney, assis-
tant circuit attorney or former assistant circuit attorney, peace officer or former peace offi-
cer, elected official or former elected official during or because of the exercise of his official 
duty; 
6. The offender caused or directed another to commit murder in the first degree or commit-
ted murder in the first degree as an agent or employee of another person; 
7. The murder in the first degree was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in 
that it involved torture, or depravity of mind; 
8. The murder in the first degree was committed against any peace officer, or fireman while 
engaged in the performance of his official duty; 
9. The murder in the first degree was committed by a person in, or who has escaped from, 
the lawful custody of a peace officer or place of lawful confinement; 
10. The murder in the first degree was committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering 
with, or preventing a lawful arrest or custody in a place of lawful confinement, of himself or 
another; 
11. The murder in the first degree was committed while the defendant was engaged in the 
perpetration or was aiding or encouraging another person to perpetrate or attempt to perpe-
trate a felony of any degree of rape, sodomy, burglary, robbery, kidnapping, or any felony 
offense in chapter 195, RSMo (drug offenses); 
12. The murdered individual was a witness or potential witness in any past or pending in-
vestigation or past or pending prosecution, and was killed as a result of his status as a wit-
ness or potential witness; 
13. The murdered individual was an employee of an institution or facility of the department 
of corrections of this state or local correction agency and was killed in the course of per-
forming his official duties, or the murdered individual was an inmate of such institution or 
facility; 
14. The murdered individual was killed as a result of the hijacking of an airplane, train, ship, 
bus or other public conveyance; 
15. The murder was committed for the purpose of concealing or attempting to conceal any 
felony offense defined in chapter 195, RSMo (drug offenses); 
16. The murder was committed for the purpose of causing or attempting to cause a person to 
refrain from initiating or aiding in the prosecution of a felony office defined in chapter 195, 
RSMo (drug offenses); 
17. The murder was committed during the commission of a crime which is part of a pattern 
of criminal street gang activity as defined in section 578.421. 
Id. 
 18. See, e.g., FDPA, 18 U.S.C. § 3592 (2006); ALA. CODE § 13A-5-49 (1975); ARIZ. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 13-703(F) (1973); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-604 (1975); CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2 (West 2001); 
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-11-1-3 (West ); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-46a (1973); DEL. CODE ANN. 
tit. 11, § 4209(e) (1972); FLA. STAT. § 921.141(5) (2005); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30 (1973); IDAHO 
CODE ANN. § 19-2515(3)(b) (1998); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-1(b) (1973); IND. CODE § 35-50-2-9(b) 
(1977); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4625 (2006); KENT. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532-025(2)(a) (West 2001); LA. 
CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 905.4 (1976); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-303(g) (West 2002); MISS. 
CODE ANN. § 99-19-101(5) (1977); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-303 (1977); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-
2523 (1973); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.033 (1977); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:5(VII) (1974); N.M. 
STAT. § 31-20A-5 (1979); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(e) (1977); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04 
(2002); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 701.12 (1976); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.150(1)(b) (1985); 42 PA. CONS. 
STAT. § 9711(d) (1974); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(C)(a) (1974); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27A-1 
(1979); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-204(i) (1989); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071 (Vernon 
1973); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-202 (1973); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.2 (1977); WASH. REV. CODE 
§ 10.95.020 (2003); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-102(h) (1982). 
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death penalty could not be charged.  For example, one of the aggravating 
circumstances is that “the offender by his act of murder in the first degree 
knowingly created a great risk of death to more than one person by means 
of a weapon or device which would normally be hazardous to the lives of 
more than one person.”19  On its face this seems to apply only to situations 
involving explosives or bombs that, by their nature, would “normally be 
hazardous to more than one person.”20  However, this aggravating circum-
stance has been interpreted to include the use of a handgun when more 
than one person is in the vicinity.21  Also, the aggravating circumstance 
which applies to “the murder of an individual who was a witness or poten-
tial witness in any past or pending investigation or past or pending prose-
cution, and was killed as a result of his status as a witness or potential wit-
ness”22 by its plain language applies only when the victim is a witness or is 
going to be a witness in a pending criminal case or investigation.  How-
ever, this has been extended to include situations in which the victim is 
considered to be a witness in the current case.23  So a victim is considered 
to be a witness in the potential investigation of the victim’s own murder.24  
One can only try to imagine a case in which this aggravating circumstance 
could not be applicable.  An overview of the other statutory aggravating 
circumstances shows that between the sheer number of aggravating cir-
cumstances available and lax interpretation by courts, virtually any murder 
in the first degree could conceivably be death eligible.  This is left solely to 
the discretion of the prosecuting attorney. 
The statutory aggravating circumstances are generally self-evident 
from the facts of the guilt phase of the trial.  For example, that a victim was 
a police officer killed during his official duties, or because of his official 
duties, would be a fact presented in the guilt phase of the case.25  If the 
  
 19. MO. REV. STAT. § 565.032.2(3) (2000). 
 20. Id.    
 21. State v. Kenley, 952 S.W.2d 250, 275 (Mo. 1997) (en banc).  The Missouri Supreme Court, 
upon rejecting the defendant’s argument in Kenley, stated “the aggravating circumstance in question is 
not constitutionally infirm because it does not apply to every death penalty candidate.  It does not apply 
to defendants who do not use weapons or devices or to defendants who do not endanger more than one 
person.”  Id.  Although this interpretation of the statute may seem so broad as to render the narrowing 
function of the aggravating circumstance moot, Mr. Kenley did not get relief from the Eighth Circuit or 
the U.S. Supreme Court and has since been executed.    
 22. MO. REV. STAT. § 565.032.2(12) (2000). 
 23. State v. Shafer, 969 S.W.2d 719, 739 (Mo. 1998) (en banc). 
 24. Id.  The Missouri Supreme Court in Shafer made clear that this aggravating circumstance applies 
if “a reasonable trier of fact can infer that the defendant foresaw an investigation and killed the victim 
to eliminate that threat.”  Id.  The Missouri Supreme Court in Shafer cited to another case, State v. 
Copeland, 928 S.W.2d 828, 850 (Mo. 1996) (en banc), which also interpreted this aggravating circum-
stance this broadly.  One can assume since the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari in Copeland that 
the Court was not overly concerned about this interpretation either. 
 25. MO. REV. STAT. § 565.032.2(5), (8) (2000). 
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defendant is found guilty of murder in the first degree, what additional 
evidence would the state have to present—to prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the victim was a police officer?  What possible defense could 
the defendant raise?  Likewise, the fact that the defendant killed more than 
one person will be obvious from the guilt phase evidence.26  What defense 
could be presented?  Even statutory aggravating circumstances such as the 
defendant having a prior conviction for murder, while not being guilt phase 
evidence, can rarely be defended against.   
Thus, statutory schemes which purport to require the state to prove an 
aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt do not, in fact, nar-
row the class of homicides for which individuals can be killed.  U.S. citi-
zens are not given fair trials simply because the evidence used to kill them 
is nothing more than the evidence used to convict them.  Therefore, due 
process requirements are not met when the “additional” facts that the state 
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt in order to enhance a defendant’s 
punishment to death are all facts which are presented and decided against 
the defendant during the guilt phase.  Nor is due process met when there 
are so many statutory aggravating circumstances that any homicide could 
be grounds for the death penalty. 
B. Statutory Mitigating Circumstances  
In contrast to statutory aggravating circumstances, the statutory miti-
gating circumstances are generally not as dependent upon the guilt phase 
evidence.  In Missouri, as in most jurisdictions, they are more focused on 
the defendant’s characteristics and mental state at the time of the crime.  
There are only seven statutory mitigating circumstances in Missouri.27  As 
previously noted, there are seventeen statutory aggravating circum-
stances.28  Some of the statutory mitigating circumstances are rarely if ever 
  
 26. Id. § 565.032.2(2). 
 27. MO. REV. STAT. § 565.032.3 (2000).  Statutory mitigating circumstances include 
the following: 
1. The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity; 
2. The murder in the first degree was committed while the defendant was under the influ-
ence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance; 
3. The victim was a participant in the defendant’s conduct or consented to the act; 
4. The defendant was an accomplice in the murder in the first degree committed by another 
person and his participation was relatively minor; 
5. The defendant acted under extreme duress or under the substantial domination of another 
person; 
6. The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform 
his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired; 
7. The age of the defendant at the time of the crime. 
Id. 
 28. Id. § 565.032.2. 
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used.  The statutory mitigating circumstance regarding the age of the de-
fendant has been practically rendered obsolete by the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s decision that the execution of juveniles is unconstitutional.29  Cer-
tainly, the age of the defendant could be a statutory mitigating circum-
stance in any case (everyone has an age), but why one would choose to 
submit it to a jury in the trial of say a thirty-year old defendant is unclear.  
In the narrow class of cases where the defendant is between eighteen and 
twenty-one, this may still be of value.  
It is also unclear how useful to the defense the statutory mitigating cir-
cumstance that the victim was a participant in the defendant’s conduct, or 
consented to the act, is when applied.30  I am unaware of any case in Mis-
souri during the last ten years where this mitigating circumstance was ap-
plicable and submitted to a jury.  My best guess at why this statutory miti-
gator is included, is that felony murder was considered first degree murder 
in Missouri until 1984 and was subject to the punishment of death.31  Logi-
cally, this mitigator would apply in a situation where a co-defendant is 
killed by police during the commission of a crime and the defendant is 
prosecuted for the death of the co-defendant.  It seems as though the legis-
lature never got around to amending the statute.  This should be a warning 
that there are serious problems with this system.   
Since the Supreme Court’s decision banning the execution of the men-
tally retarded, jurors are instructed to consider this in making their decision 
on punishment.32  If the defense can show by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that the defendant is mentally retarded, the jury cannot return a ver-
dict of death.33  This is not a statutory mitigating circumstance but is a bar 
to death eligibility.34 
After reviewing the elements that are statutorily prescribed for the pen-
alty phase of a capital trial, it becomes obvious that the majority of the 
evidence is not going to be related to proving an aggravating circumstance 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  Unless the defense is putting on psychological 
evidence to support a statutory mitigating circumstance, it is clear that 
much of what will be presented by the defense may not be related to evi-
dence specified by statute.  
  
 29. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005). 
 30. MO. REV. STAT. § 565.032.3(3) (2000). 
 31. Id. § 565.003 (1978). 
 32. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318–21 (2002); see also MO. REV. STAT. § 565.030.4(1). 
 33. MO. REV. STAT. § 565.030.4(1). 
 34. Id. 
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III.  THE WEIGHING STEP—SELECTION OF THIS DEFENDANT FOR THE 
DEATH PENALTY 
The real heart of what is presented in the penalty phase of a capital trial 
is usually non-statutory aggravation and non-statutory mitigation.  This 
type of evidence is usually considered by the jury in the “weighing step” of 
the process.35   
So long as the qualification step requires the state to prove a statutory 
aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt, and state law sets up 
some procedure for a jury to consider mitigating evidence, the selection 
step can be set up any way the state decides.36  It even seems permissible at 
this point to require the defendant to carry the burden of proving that miti-
  
 35. See, e.g., MAI CR-3d 314.44.  MAI CR-3d reads as follows: 
(As to Count ___,if) (If) you have unanimously found beyond a reasonable doubt that 
(one or more of) the statutory aggravating circumstance(s) submitted in Instruction No. ___ 
exists, you must then determine whether there are facts or circumstances in mitigation of 
punishment which are sufficient to outweigh facts and circumstances in aggravation of pun-
ishment. 
In deciding this question, you may consider all of the evidence presented in both the 
guilt and the punishment stages of trial, including evidence presented in support of the statu-
tory aggravating circumstances (s) submitted in Instruction No. ___, and evidence presented 
in support of mitigating circumstances submitted in this instruction.   
As (a circumstance) (circumstances) that may be in mitigation of punishment, you 
shall consider: [Insert in indented paragraphs and, if more than one, list and number in 
separate paragraphs any one or more of the following “statutory mitigating circumstances” 
which are supported by the evidence and requested by the defendant.  Omit this paragraph 
if there are no such circumstances to submit.] 
1. Whether the defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity. 
2. Whether the murder of [name of victim in this count] was committed while the de-
fendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance. 
3. Whether [name of victim in this count] was a participant in the defendant’s conduct 
or consented to the act. 
4. Whether the defendant was an accomplice in the murder of [name of victim in this 
count] and whether his participation was relatively minor. 
5. Whether the defendant acted under extreme duress or under substantial domination 
of another person. 
6. Whether the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or 
to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired. 
7. The age of the defendant at the time of the offense. 
You shall also consider any (other) facts or circumstances which you find from the 
evidence in mitigation of punishment. 
It is not necessary that all jurors agree upon particular facts and circumstances in miti-
gation of punishment.  If each juror determines that there are facts or circumstances in miti-
gation of punishment sufficient to outweigh the evidence in aggravation of punishment, then 
you must return a verdict fixing defendant’s punishment at imprisonment for life by the De-
partment of Corrections without eligibility for probation or parole. 
Id. 
 36. Kansas v. Marsh, 126 S. Ct. 2516, 2525 (2006) (citing Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 172–
74 (1983)). 
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gating circumstances outweigh aggravating circumstances.37  The Supreme 
Court has never held that the Constitution requires a specific method for 
balancing aggravating and mitigating factors.38 
In Missouri, the jury is instructed to consider whether “evidence in ag-
gravation of punishment is not outweighed by evidence in mitigation of 
punishment.”39  The jury is required to return a sentence of life only if its 
decision is unanimous—that the evidence in mitigation of punishment out-
weighs the evidence in aggravation of punishment.40  However, even if 
eleven jurors believe that evidence in mitigation of punishment outweighs 
evidence in aggravation of punishment, and only one juror believes that 
aggravation outweighs mitigation, the jury can consider and even return a 
sentence of death.41  Most statutory schemes are set up in a similar manner, 
although some place the burden of proof on the defendant to show by a 
preponderance of the evidence that evidence in mitigation of punishment 
outweighs evidence in aggravation of punishment.42  Requiring a capital 
defendant to bear the burden of proof should be per se unconstitutional.  
Returning a verdict of death without unanimity of the jury also should be 
per se unconstitutional. 
A. Non-Statutory Aggravation 
Non-statutory aggravating evidence is any evidence that the state pre-
sents in the penalty phase of the trial that is not directly related to proving 
one of the statutory aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt.  
There are many types of non-statutory aggravating evidence that the state 
may choose to present.  One of the most common is victim impact evi-
dence.  Victim impact evidence is testimony from people who knew the 
victim and can give the jury some idea of the victim’s life and can testify 
about how the death of the victim has affected them.  The Supreme Court 
found that this type of evidence does not violate the Constitution but noted 
that it should be a “quick glimpse” of the victim in life.43  However, this 
  
 37. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 645 (1990).  The Court in Marsh relied extensively on Walton 
and found it controlling law.  Marsh, 126 S. Ct. at 2527.  However, the Court in Marsh noted that the 
Kansas statute in question did require the state to prove that evidence in aggravation of punishment 
outweigh evidence in mitigation of punishment beyond a reasonable doubt.  Id. 
 38. Id. at 2524–25. 
 39. MAI-CR3d 313.44. 
 40. MO. REV. STAT. § 565.032.4(3) (2000); MAI-CR3d 313.44. 
 41. MAI-CR3d 313.44. 
 42. See Walton, 497 U.S. at 650 (finding that so long as states allow for the jury to consider mitigat-
ing evidence, they may place the burden on the defendant); see also Manns v. Quarterman, 236 Fed. 
Appx. 908 (5th Cir. 2007) (Texas law placing burden on defendant to prove mitigation outweighs 
aggravation is permissible). 
 43. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 830 (1991) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
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“quick glimpse” has morphed into a full-length feature film in some 
cases.44  Again, this is not about punishing what was done but to whom it 
was done.  Killing a middle class white person becomes very different 
from killing a poor black person.  This should be unconstitutional because 
a death sentence is supposed to be based solely on the specific facts of the 
crime and the individual characteristics of the defendant.45  There is reason 
to believe that the victim’s race and socio-economic status seem to matter 
very much in capital sentencing.46 
In Missouri, victim impact evidence is offered without any instruc-
tional guidance.  There is no burden of proof for victim impact evidence.  
It is admitted completely at the discretion of the trial judge.47 
Evidence of the defendant’s prior bad acts may also be admitted as 
non-statutory aggravating evidence.48  This can include arrests, unadjudi-
cated bad acts, pending cases that have yet to be adjudicated, and cases that 
have previously been tried and in which the defendant has been found not 
guilty.49  This is basically character evidence—the proof of punishment 
based not on what was done but rather on who did it.  Convicting by char-
acter is nothing more than “corruption of the blood” in modern form.50 
Much of the non-statutory aggravating evidence the jury is allowed to 
hear would not normally be admitted as evidence in the guilt phase of the 
  
 44. State v. Storey, 40 S.W.3d 898, 908–09 (Mo. 2001) (en banc).  The Missouri Supreme Court 
held that it was not excessive to allow the state to present victim impact evidence that included photos 
of the victim’s tombstone, readings of poems written about the victim, photos and testimony about a 
memorial garden planted in the victim’s memory, photos of plaques commemorating the garden, copies 
of a special edition of the school newspaper about the victim’s death, reading of a eulogy from the 
victim’s funeral, photos of a balloon release in the victim’s honor, and photos of the victim with her 
entire school class.  Id. 
 45. See, e.g., Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604–05 (1978). 
 46. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 617 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring) (discussing race and 
socio-economic factors as they relate to the death penalty).   
 47. MO. REV. STAT. § 565.030.4 (2000). 
 48. State v. Forrest, 183 S.W.3d 218, 224 (Mo. 2006) (evidence of defendant’s character relevant as 
penalty phase evidence). 
 49. State v. Clark, 197 S.W.3d 598, 600 (Mo. 2006) (prior jury finding of not guilty does not bar 
prosecution from presenting facts of that incident in penalty phase of trial); Forrest, 183 S.W.3d at 224 
(evidence of unadjudicated criminal acts permissible as penalty phase evidence); State v. Middleton, 
995 S.W.2d 443, 468 (Mo. 1999) (evidence of pending homicides admissible in penalty phase of capi-
tal murder trial). 
 50. Corruption of the blood is a common law penalty that caused convicted felons to be unable to 
inherit or pass property on to their children.  See Lewis v. Grinker, 111 F. Supp. 2d 142, 178–81 
(E.D.N.Y. 2000) (discussing corruption of the blood and its treatment in the United States).  Corruption 
of the blood has not been looked upon favorably by U.S. courts because it is “contrary to the basic 
concept of our system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility or 
wrongdoing.”  Id. (citing Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972)).  Character evi-
dence, like corruption of the blood, does not tie punishment to individual responsibility or wrongdoing 
but to the much less concrete concept of society’s perception of “bad” character. 
File: Turlington - 6 Pierce L. Rev. 3 Created on: 3/5/2008 9:48:00 PM Last Printed: 3/10/2008 10:19:00 PM 
2008 COMPLETELY UNGUIDED DISCRETION 479 
 
trial.51  Here, the rules of evidence, in what should be the most carefully 
scrutinized area of law, are entirely lax.  The rationale for this has been that 
while capital punishment demands increased reliability, the admission of 
more, rather than less, evidence during the penalty phase enhances reliabil-
ity.52  This doesn’t make any sense.  If juries are not allowed to hear certain 
types of evidence because it is too prejudicial, or not probative of an indi-
vidual’s guilt, why does that same evidence somehow transform into being 
more reliable simply because it is being introduced in the penalty phase?  
If the guilt phase case against an individual is based solely on circumstan-
tial evidence, or eyewitness identification, how would evidence of prior 
violent acts make a sentence of death more reliable?  It seems that the op-
posite is true—that the sentence of death would be based more on past 
conduct than on the strength of the facts in the current case.  This should 
not be acceptable if our constitutional standards truly require that the death 
penalty be applied in a rational and non-arbitrary way. 
The admission of non-statutory aggravating evidence is at the discre-
tion of the trial judge, and this discretion is given deference by appellate 
courts upon review.  In Missouri there is no guidance for what, if anything, 
a trial judge should exclude other than the fact that the state must give no-
tice of any non-statutory aggravating evidence they intend to submit.53  
Presumably, as long as the state has given notice, anything is admissible.   
Currently there is no statutory provision or instructional provision con-
cerning the admission of non-statutory aggravating evidence.54  The jury is 
not instructed as to what, if any, burden of proof should apply to non-
statutory aggravating evidence.55  Under the Federal Death Penalty Act, a 
trial court has discretion to exclude evidence if its probative value is out-
weighed by the danger of creating unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, or 
misleading the jury.56  However, it is unclear what, if any, evidence is be-
ing excluded by trial court judges in federal court.   
Some federal courts suggest a pre-trial hearing for the judge to deter-
mine if non-statutory aggravating evidence meets a preponderance of the 
evidence standard before submitting it to a jury.57  Apparently, there is no 
  
 51. Missouri does not have codified rules of evidence—they are almost strictly common law based.  
However, the FDPA for example, in section 3593(c), specifically authorizes the admission of evidence 
that would not be admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence.  FDPA, 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c).  The 
Rules of Evidence do not apply to sentencing proceedings.  FED. R. EVID. 1101(d)(3). 
 52. United States v. Lee, 374 F.3d 637, 648 (8th Cir. 2004). 
 53. State v. Debler, 856 S.W.2d 641, 657 (Mo. 1993). 
 54. See MO. REV. STAT. § 565.030 (2000); see also MAI-CR3d 314 series.   
 55. Id. 
 56. United States v. Fulks, 454 F.3d 410, 437 (4th Cir. 2006). 
 57. The trial judge should make a determination whether that evidence is “relevant, that the evi-
dence supporting it is sufficiently reliable, and that the probative value of the evidence is not out-
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standard procedure for dealing with the admission of non-statutory evi-
dence. 
Even previously adjudicated bad acts where the defendant was found 
not guilty are admissible in a sentencing phase.58  The reasoning behind 
this is that an acquittal in a criminal charge “does not prove that the defen-
dant is innocent; it merely proves the existence of a reasonable doubt as to 
his guilt.”59  Recent Missouri case law suggests that the burden of proof in 
a non-death-sentencing hearing—to admit facts of a case that previously 
resulted in a not guilty verdict—should be a preponderance of the evidence 
standard.60  However, there are currently no instructions in Missouri given 
to juries in either non-capital or capital sentencing trials delineating a bur-
den of proof.61  
The fact that the admission of non-statutory aggravating evidence is 
done on a case-by-case basis, at the discretion of trial judges without any 
statutory guidance, illustrates that the constitutional requirement that the 
death penalty not be applied arbitrarily, cannot be met.   
B. Non-Statutory Mitigating Circumstances 
Non-statutory mitigating circumstances can be anything related to the 
defendant’s background, character, or experiences.62  Interestingly, the 
most effective non-statutory mitigation may be related to the guilt phase 
evidence.  Lingering doubt of the defendant’s guilt has been shown to be of 
the most persuasive evidence to capital jurors.63  Although limiting the 
  
weighed by the danger of creating unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, or misleading the jury.”  
United States v. Sampson, 275 F. Supp. 2d 49, 101 (1st Cir. 2003). 
 58. State v. Clark, 197 S.W.3d 598, 600 (Mo. 2006) (en banc) (burden of proof preponderance in 
non-death case but no instructional guidance).  The U.S. Supreme Court suggests that burden of proof 
should be preponderance. 
 59. United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 155 (1997) (per curiam). 
 60. Clark, 197 S.W.3d at 600. 
 61. See MAI CR3d 305.03, 313.44.  However, MAI CR-3d 305.3 is applicable to the sentencing 
phase of a non-capital jury trial and reads as follows: 
The law applicable to this stage of the trial is stated in these instructions and Instruc-
tion Nos. 1 and 2 that the Court read to you in the first stage of the trial. 
In assessing and declaring the defendant’s punishment, you should consider the evi-
dence presented in this case, the argument of counsel, and the instructions of the Court.  
(You may consider the evidence presented in either stage of the trial.) 
You will be provided with forms of verdict for your convenience. 
You cannot return any verdict as the verdict of the jury unless all twelve jurors agree 
to it, but it should be signed by your foreperson alone. 
When you have concluded your deliberations, you will complete the applicable 
form(s) to which you unanimously agree and return (it) (them) together with all unused 
forms and the written instructions of the Court.   
 62. MO. REV. STAT. § 565.030.4 (2000). 
 63. Although there has long been evidence to show that lingering doubt is a mitigating circumstance 
that jurors often consider, see, e.g., William S. Geimer & Jonathan Amsterdam, Why Jurors Vote Life 
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types of mitigating evidence that can be considered by a jury is prohibited 
by the U.S. Constitution,64 the Missouri Supreme Court found that the trial 
court was not in error when it precluded the defense from arguing, in the 
penalty phase, that a sentence of death would be very traumatic for the 
defendant’s family.65  
In Missouri, the only instructions given to the jury regarding mitigating 
circumstances are that if the jury unanimously finds that there are facts and 
circumstances in mitigation of punishment sufficient to outweigh facts and 
circumstances in aggravation of punishment then they must return a verdict 
of life.66  They are also told that each juror does not have to agree on par-
ticular facts in mitigation of punishment.67  
  
or Death: Operative Factors in Ten Florida Death Penalty Cases, 15 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 21–22 
(1987/1988), courts and legislatures have not formally recognized lingering doubt as a mitigating 
circumstance.  See Oregon v. Guzek, 546 U.S. 517, 525 (2006) (disallowing lingering doubt about guilt 
to be considered as a mitigating factor).  In Guzek, the defendant had been granted a penalty phase 
retrial.  The defendant sought to introduce additional evidence of actual innocence which had not been 
presented at his guilt phase trial.  Id. at 523.  The Supreme Court held that the defendant could be 
limited to evidence that had been presented in the guilt phase of his first trial on the penalty phase 
retrial.  Id.  There was no due process right to present evidence of lingering doubt.  Id. at 525. 
 64. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 608 (1978). 
 65. State v. Forrest, 183 S.W.3d 218, 226 (Mo. 2006) (en banc).  
 66. See MAI-CR3d 314.44, 314.48.  MAI CR-3d 314.48 is a verdict-directing instruction and 
merely restates the process that the jury should follow in reaching a verdict.  It reads as follows: 
You will be provided with forms of verdict for your convenience.  You cannot return 
any verdict imposing a sentence of death unless all twelve jurors concur in and agree to it, 
but any such verdict should be signed by your foreperson alone. 
(As to Count __, if) (If) you unanimously decide, after considering all of the evidence 
and instructions of law given to you, that the defendant must be put to death for the murder 
of [name of victim in this count], your foreperson must complete the verdict form and write 
into your verdict (the) (all of the) statutory aggravating circumstance(s) submitted in In-
struction No. ___ [Insert the number given to MAI-CR3d 314.40.] which you found beyond 
a reasonable doubt.  The foreperson will sign the verdict form so fixing the punishment.   
If you unanimously decide that the facts or circumstances in mitigation of punishment 
outweigh the facts and circumstances in aggravation of punishment, then the defendant must 
be punished for the murder of [name of victim in this count] by imprisonment for life by the 
Department of Corrections without eligibility for probation or parole, and your foreperson 
will sign the verdict form so fixing the punishment. 
If you unanimously decide, after considering all of the evidence and instructions of 
law, that the defendant must be punished for the murder of [name of victim in this count] by 
imprisonment for life by the Department of Corrections without eligibility for probation or 
parole, your foreperson will sign the verdict form so fixing the punishment.   
(If you unanimously find by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant is 
mentally retarded, as submitted in Instruction No. ___ [Insert the number given to MAI-
CR3d 314.38.], then your foreperson must sign the verdict form fixing the punishment at 
imprisonment for life by the Department of Corrections without eligibility for probation or 
parole.) 
(If you are unable to unanimously find that the defendant was at least eighteen years of 
age at the time of the murder as submitted in Instruction No.__ [Insert the number given to 
MAI-CR3d 314.40.], then your foreperson must sign the verdict form fixing the punishment 
at imprisonment for life by the Department of Corrections without eligibility for probation 
or parole.) 
 
File: Turlington - 6 Pierce L. Rev. 3 Created on:  3/5/2008 9:48:00 PM Last Printed: 3/10/2008 10:19:00 PM 
482 PIERCE LAW REVIEW Vol. 6, No. 3 
 
The defendant in a capital trial should have the right to have all the 
steps determined against him by a “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard to 
satisfy the requirements of the Constitution.  Requiring only that aggravat-
ing circumstances be proven beyond a reasonable doubt does not narrow 
the class of homicides subject to the death penalty and does not provide 
increased reliability in sentencing.  Obviously these are determinations 
about facts and, moreover, the Constitution guarantees the right to trial by 
jury—not trial by judge—precisely so that the jury can protect the people 
from the tyranny of the state. 
In State v. Whitfield, the Missouri Supreme Court implied that the 
weighing step is a fact finding step and, therefore, should be required to be 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the burden should rest upon 
the state.68  Although this issue has been raised at the trial level subsequent 
to Whitfield, the court had declined to address this issue.  Two other states, 
Colorado69 and Nevada,70 have also concluded that the weighing step is a 
factual finding by the jury, not merely discretionary weighing.  Federal 
courts have not reached the same conclusion.  The Ninth Circuit in United 
States v. Mitchell71 held that the weighing process merely channels the 
  
If you are unable to unanimously find the existence of at least one statutory aggravat-
ing circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt, as submitted in Instruction No.___ [Insert the 
number given to MAI-CR3d 314.40.], then your foreperson must sign the verdict form fixing 
the punishment at imprisonment for life by the Department of Corrections without eligibility 
for probation or parole. 
If you do unanimously find the existence of at least one statutory aggravating circum-
stance beyond a reasonable doubt, as submitted in Instruction No.___ [Insert the number 
given to MAI-CR3d 314.40.], and you are unable to unanimously find that the facts or cir-
cumstances in mitigation of punishment outweigh the facts and circumstances in aggrava-
tion of punishment, but are unable to agree upon the punishment, your foreperson will com-
plete the verdict form and sign the verdict form stating that you are unable to decide or 
agree upon the punishment.  In such case, you must answer the questions on the verdict 
form and write into your verdict (the) (all of) the statutory aggravating circumstance(s) sub-
mitted in Instruction No.___ [Insert the number given to MAI-CR3d 314.40.] the you found 
beyond a reasonable doubt and your foreperson must sign the verdict form stating that you 
are unable to decide or agree upon the punishment. 
If you return a verdict indicating that you are unable to decide or agree upon the pun-
ishment, the Court will fix the defendant’s punishment at death or at imprisonment for life 
by the Department of Corrections without eligibility for probation or parole.  You will bear 
in mind, however, that under the law, it is the primary duty and responsibility of the jury to 
fix the punishment.   
When you have concluded your deliberations you will complete the applicable form(s) 
to which all twelve jurors agree and return (it) (them) with all unused forms and the written 
instructions of the Court.  
 67. MAI-CR3d 314.44. 
 68. State v. Whitfield, 107 S.W.3d 253, 260 (Mo. 2003) (en banc). 
 69. Woldt v. People, 64 P.3d 256, 270 (Colo. 2003) (en banc). 
 70. Johnson v. State, 59 P.3d 450, 460–61 (Nev. 2002). 
 71. 502 F.3d 931, 993 (9th Cir. 2007). 
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jury’s discretion and also that it does not result in a finding of essential 
fact.72   
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Three decades of U.S. Supreme Court cases have sought to reduce ar-
bitrariness in capital sentencing.  However, by focusing on how the gov-
ernment narrows the class of homicides in which the death penalty may be 
sought, the Court has failed to appreciate how a capital trial works in prac-
tice.  Rarely are the aggravating circumstances issues of fact that will be 
seriously contested.  The courts and legislatures are failing to recognize 
that the bulk of evidence in capital sentencing trials is admitted without 
rules of evidence.  This is appalling.   
The reasoning that more evidence results in more reliability in sentenc-
ing is simply not true.  Juries need to be given more guidance on how to 
use non-statutory aggravating and non-statutory mitigating evidence in the 
sentencing process.  The burden of proof should be beyond a reasonable 
doubt for the weighing step.  Juries are clearly making a factual determina-
tion when deciding if evidence in aggravation of punishment outweighs 
evidence in mitigation of punishment.  Instructions that explain the burden 
of proof for non-statutory aggravating and non-statutory mitigating evi-
dence need to be given to juries.  Also, courts and legislatures need to 
make clear rules about what evidence can be admitted and what should be 
excluded.  Hopefully, as capital jurisprudence evolves, courts will take a 
closer look at non-statutory evidence and take steps to correct these prob-
lems. 
  
 72. Id. 
